by RockyMountainNavy, 17 May 2024
A recent article in the May 2024 issue of Proceedings discusses how the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has embraced wargaming “with an almost religious zeal” (Martinson, R. D. “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War.” Proceedings. May 2024. Vol. 150/5/1,455). As author Ryan Martinson points out: “[The PLAN] have studied wargaming’s many potential advantages, from helping the PLAN overcome its lack of recent combat experience to shedding light on how to employ its new weapons and platforms to maximum effect—and they want more.” Readers will likely assume that the PLAN is playing catch-up to the U.S. Navy (USN). Reality, though, is not so clear. Martinson’s article is but the latest writing that emphasize the U.S. Navy needs to get more serious about the use of a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) in wargaming… like the PLAN apparently already does.
Don the Blue
The existence of a “professional” Blue Team in the PLAN is a relatively new situation. The Blue Team Center was formed in August 2012 to serve, as Martinson relates, as a “”whetstone” to sharpen the “sword” that was the fleet” (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”). The formation of a dedicated PLAN opposition force, at least in part, was just a few years after a reference to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) use of a “dedicated opposition forces and the newly deployed Army Unit Exercise and Evaluation System” in the Stride 2009 exercise of August 2009 (see Cozad, M. (2019) “Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?” Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA. National Defense University Press, p. 212).
Martinson explains the mission of the PLAN Blue Team Center thusly:
The Blue Team Center’s main mission is to simulate enemy commanders and their staffs in games and exercises held at the high-tactical and campaign levels of war, striving to do so “as realistically as possible.” Playing an “authentic” Blue means playing the enemy “in both form and spirit.” To that end, the center seeks to simulate Blue’s command systems and command methods, thereby creating an overall “command environment” that reflects reality. During wargames, center experts sometimes even don adversary uniforms. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
Alas, the PLAN is not doing innocent cosplay here. Assuming the adversary’s persona is not unlike the charge Admiral Chester Nimitz gave to his Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Captain (later Rear Admiral) Edwin T. Layton, in World War II:
I want you to be the Admiral Nagumo [the Japanese commander of the Pearl Harbor attack] of my staff. I want your every thought, every instinct, as you believe Admiral Nagumo might have them. You are to see the war, their operations, their aims, from the Japanese viewpoint and keep me advised what you are thinking about, what you are doing, and what purpose, what strategy, motivates your operations. (Layton, Edwin T., Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.). (1985). “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway – Breaking the Secrets. Naval Institute Press, p. 357)
Blue playing Red
I went in search of when the USN started using a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) but had difficulty pinning down a date. For the U.S. Army a 2024 article by Major Thomas Haycock has some history for that part of the joint force: “Between 1967 and 1976, Field Manual (FM) 105-5, Maneuver Control, provided the foundation for a generic OPFOR with no nationality but who spoke the fictional Esperanto language” (Haycock, T. Major, USA. (2024) We Need More Professional OPFOR: Dedicated Professional Opposing Forces at Home Station Are an Asymmetric Advantage.” Military Review Online Exclusive).
Haycock goes on to explain:
Fortunately, this practice ended in 1976, when new doctrine did away with the vague, nationless OPFOR and instead patterned them to mimic potential Warsaw Pact opponents. A special “Red Thrust” school was established to train the new OPFOR, where new OPFOR soldiers “ate, slept, and lived like Soviet soldiers.” At Red Thrust, “using Soviet Army manuals, soldiers learned formations, tactics, methods of attack and counterattack, Soviet unit organization, weapons identification, and command and control procedures.” The combination of new doctrine and immersion in understanding potential adversaries enabled the NTC [National Training Center] to offer an incredibly capable and dedicated professional OPFOR since it became operational in 1982. (Haycock, “We Need More Professional OPFOR”)
My research reveals that from the founding of the Naval War College in 1884 through at least 1966 the opposing force was usually (always?) played by students. This is clear in the March 1966 edition of The United States Naval War College Fundamentals of War Gaming which defines “players” in part this way:
… the players are usually divided into two opposing teams… The players act out their assigned command roles, that is, they make the same decisions and take the same actions that they would if the imaginary forces and weapons under their command were real forces and real weapons. In order for the game to be successful, the players must enter, wholeheartedly, into the spirit of play. (McHugh, F. J. (2011). Fundamentals of War Gaming. Naval War College.)
Sometime between 1966 and 2016 the USN started using dedicated opposing forces for training. Speaking from personal experience, as a young Naval Officer I played the Red Submarine commander in Exercise Tandem Thrust ’92, a large 23-day amphibious exercise with over 20,000 military participants where I was given a single Type-209 diesel-powered submarine to operate against Blue.
In the current war game, one aggressive Third World nation–Uniland–is locked in a territorial dispute with its peaceful neighbor, Minoria. A recent seizure of Minorian territory along the disputed boundary has prompted the United Nations to ask the United States to quell civil disorder and to restore Minorian sovereignty. (“Tandem Thrust: Troops From 4 Service Branches Take Part in 23-Day War Game,” LA Times, 14 Jul 1992).
As I recall, my “intel brief” had very loose bounds so I took inspiration for my operations from my study of the Falklands War and especially the operations of the Argentine submarine ARA San Luis (for a somewhat then contemporary view see Harper, S.R., LCDR, USN. (1994) Submarine Operations During the Falklands War. US. Naval War College. Available through DTIC at ADA279554). I also recall that after a few days exercise control (the White Cell) and I sat down with the Intel Observer to Blue to understand why Blue had not yet located me. This lead to me “adjusting” my submarine’s operations which enabled Blue anti-submarine warfare assets to quickly neutralize the threat I presented.
While I played the OPFOR in 1992 my team was far from a dedicated, specialized organization. A 2016 news article from Naval Warfare Development Command reported on a first-of-its-kind four-day OPFOR workshop for portraying the adversary in training and exercises:
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) hosted the first-of-its-kind Opposition Force (OPFOR) workshop Dec. 12-15, 2016, at the Information Warfare Training Command on NAS Oceana Dam Neck Annex, Va….”The purpose of the workshop was to develop an OPFOR Community of Practice that will help us achieve a common understanding and synchronization in the portrayal of adversary forces and capabilities,” said Cmdr. Matt Young, NWDC Senior Information Officer.
For many of the same reasons the PLAN created their Blue Team Center, we would expect the USN to be doing the same.
One of the most important methods of making exercises realistic is facing off against opponents that can win. Going up against a thinking and capable adversary creates a level of challenge that simple target practice cannot approach. Red teams and opposing forces can be highly specialized units that incorporate key intelligence insights to make their behavior more like that of a foreign competitor. (Flipov, D. “How the Fleet Forgot to Fight, Pt. 1.” cimsec.org. 17 Sep 2018)
Know your enemy
Thankfully, Martinson avoids quoting Sun Tzu when talking about “knowing the enemy”:
The precondition to playing Blue well is deep expertise in China’s potential adversaries, acquired through intensive research. Ultimately, center experts strive to “understand foreign militaries’ operational thinking, become familiar with their operational theories, and master the characteristics of their combat operations.” Specifically, they focus their studies on Blue’s “mode of thinking, behavior and habits, operational organization, tactics, equipment, and command processes.” They also examine Blue’s “strategic theories, operational thinking, organization and command, weapons and equipment, and force construction.” (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
If you are a follower of OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) the claims that the PLAN doesn’t have enough understanding of Blue rings a bit hollow:
Despite efforts to professionalize Blue Team research, the center still faces a number of impediments. According to center experts, materials on different Blue operational levels of war are scarce; training competent Blue Team professionals is extremely difficult; and existing research practices are inadequate. As a result, by its own admission, the center’s research is sometimes “not deep, not thorough, and not professional,” and games/exercises occasionally revert to “Red vs. Red confrontations.” (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
I have to wonder if the “materials…are scarce” making the research “not deep, not thorough” is a lack of professional research skills or a lack of access to sources because an authoritarian government’s is controlling access to outside information even amongst military forces. More likely, the claim of impediments are an attempt to downplay the actual level of knowledge the PLAN possesses thanks in no-small part to cyber espionage operations.
China remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks. Beijing’s cyber espionage pursuits and its industry’s export of surveillance, information, and communications technologies increase the threats of aggressive cyber operations against the United States and the suppression of the free flow of information in cyberspace.
2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Green to Blue
In a somewhat interesting twist, Martinson points out that the U.S. side is not always “Blue.”
Blue often represents a regional rival—Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam—in a scenario involving a territorial/maritime dispute. Center experts also play as third parties—“Green” cells—such as the U.S. military when it intervenes in the conflict. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
For wargamers there are a few scenario ideas in Martinson’s article. This description of “Sea Plan 2021” that dates back to 2014 could make an interesting scenario for Littoral Commander: Indo-Pacific (Sebastian Bae, The Dietz Foundation, 2023):
On other occasions, the United States is Blue even though it is the “intervening” party, as in Sea Plan 2021, when the U.S. military “blatantly interfered in Red’s internal affairs” (coded language for a Taiwan scenario), ultimately leading to high-end conflict. Blue attempted to thwart Red by creating a humanitarian corridor in the vicinity of the conflict and securing it with a no-fly/no-sail zone. It also conducted electronic warfare and network attacks against Red to degrade its communications. As the conflict escalated, Blue employed submarines, unmanned aircraft, and other air and sea assets to strike Red naval forces, with mixed success. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
I wonder if the next scenario could be done in Next War: Vietnam by Mitchell Land (GMT Games, 2020) or even John Gorkowski’s South China Sea: Modern Naval Conflict in the South Pacific (Compass Games, 2017):
Reporting on the game revealed it to have been a simulated conflict between China and Vietnam over disputed South China Sea islands. Blue attacked first, sending “special agents” to conduct sabotage operations against one of Red’s civilian vessels and an oil and gas drilling platform. Red responded by punitively seizing several disputed islands/reefs. Blue struck Red transport ships with armed fishing vessels and light surface combatants, and its submarines launched missiles against Red naval forces. An “extraregional great power”—Green, clearly the United States—sent forces close to the combat operations, placing “tremendous pressure” on Red and increasing the complexity of the conflict. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
Lessons to Learn
Martinson points out two implications of the PLAN Blue Team Center for the U. S. Navy:
First, the center is a very influential organization that deserves far more attention than it currently receives. Studying it promises valuable insights into PLAN assumptions about U.S. capabilities and how China believes these capabilities would likely be employed in a future war. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
On this point I conditionally agree with Martinson. The Blue Team Center certainly deserves more study but in doing so I hope that sources beyond the official state media are accessed. This is admittedly more difficult than one might imagine; while information outside of the PRC is often freely accessible the same cannot be said of domestic PRC media or academia, much less sensitive military information held within classified channels. Seeking understanding beyond official state media—all too often laced with propaganda or purposefully shaped to convey a party line—is very challenging.
Martinson’s second point calls for the U.S. Navy to “treat the Blue Team Center as a legitimate model for adversary simulation and consider which of its practices—if any—are worthy of emulation.” Years ago Captain Dale C. Rielage, U.S. Navy, while serving as Director for Intelligence and Information Operations for U.S. Pacific Fleet wrote “War Gaming Must Get Red Right” for the January 2017 issue of Proceedings:
To reinvigorate its war-gaming enterprise, the U.S. Navy needs to recognize that the value of war gaming hinges in large part on the quality of the opposition force—the “Red.” Captain William McCarty-Little, who introduced modern war gaming to the Naval War College in the 1880s, asserted that the key to success was “a live, vigorous enemy in the next room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.” If war gaming is to realize its potential, we must get Red right. (Rielege, D.C. CAPT, USN. “War Gaming Must Get Red Right.” Proceedings, Vol. 143/1/1,367)
Rielage goes on to state:
Some of the most profound threats to naval forces today come from unfamiliar systems and approaches. Because U.S. players are less familiar with them, they are precisely the threats whose effects are likely to be over- or under-appreciated. For example, in my experience, U.S. naval officers tend to underrepresent the threat posed by coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), particularly those that are integrated effectively with other strike and naval forces. When played, the U.S. default is to employ them as long-range coastal artillery. This approach arises from the fact that essentially no U.S. Navy officer has employed a modern CDCM. Similarly, ballistic missiles, long-range naval aviation, mines, and conventional submarines all represent unfamiliar potential adversary threats in a war game.
As games cross domains and levels of war, these challenges compound. Electromagnetic and cyber weapons must be represented insofar as possible as an adversary likely would employ them, informed by what the adversary believes about their utility and employment rather than what the United States assesses. Further, the second order effects many of these weapons create must be understood and realistically represented in concert with traditional kinetic fires. (Rielage, “War Gaming Must Get Red Right”)
In June 2017, CAPT Rielage doubled-down in another Proceedings article, “An Open Letter to the U.S. Navy From Red” where they write:
Your opposing forces often are very good, but you have trained them to know their place. Most fleet training centers have a team capable of presenting a good-to-excellent Red threat. However, our experience is that they have learned to self-regulate their aggressiveness, knowing what senior Blue and White cell members will accept. As one opposing force member recently told us during a “high-end” training event, their implied tasking included not annoying the senior flag officer participating in the event. They knew from experience that aggressive Red action and candid debriefs were historically a source of annoyance. They played accordingly. (Rielage, D.C., CAPT, USN. (2017) “An Open Letter to the U.S. Navy From Red.” Proceedings. Vol. 143/6/1,372).
Rielage goes on to invoke the infamous MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 wargame. The Experiment Report, eventually publicly released, described the OPFOR this way:
A tough, adaptive opposing force (OPFOR) was used to provide the Blue forces with a determined 2007 enemy. The Blue force and the OPFOR operated under similar rules of engagement where each could perceive and attack only what their sensors could detect. This “firewall” built between the players caused each side to perceive different views of the action and different perceptions of the outcome.
Each side operated freely inside the constraints of the scenario and the appropriate tactics given the situation and their respective goals. Appropriate actions were allowed in every case except when they prevented the continuation of the experiment and jeopardized the ability to achieve experimental objectives. In those few cases, the JFCOM ‘s Joint Experimental Control Group took one of two actions. Either the action was allowed and the results carefully documented before resetting the situation to continue the experiment, or the action was prevented after off-line analysis of the predicted results. In the latter case, the off-line analysis was documented to gain vital lessons learned on the experimental concepts. (US. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002: Experiment Report, p. x)
The experiment lessons learned, however, painted a different picture:
Discussion: OPFOR rules of engagement were not agreed upon prior to execution. This caused conflicting views between Blue, Red, and the JECG as to what could and could not be executed during the experiment. This impacted the OPFOR’s ability to execute certain planned events (night attacks, anti-access) while also adding artificiality to the game scenario. A second key issue with ROE was the disagreement on the personas of the senior OPFOR leadership. The OPFOR senior players acted in a manner that the Blue and JECG thought was consistent with the expectations of a different adversary than that defined for the experiment. (US. Joint Forces Command Millennium Challenge 2002: Experiment Report, p. K-1)
Rielage relates a different perspective:
Wargamers and exercise planners often recall Millennium Challenge 2002, an experimentation wargame run by Joint Forces Command. Marine Major General Paul Van Riper, playing an unconstrained Red, used innovative asymmetric tactics to shut down Blue in the first move. Blue had asserted that its new concepts would be tested and validated against an unconstrained Red, but when its objectives were threatened, it reset the game and created rules that, according to the final report, boxed in Red “to the point where the end state was scripted.” The entire event generally is remembered as an example of what not to do, perhaps because the game became a public controversy after General Van Riper quit as Red force commander. The reality is that we repeat this experience on a smaller scale multiple times each year. (Rielage, D.C.,“An Open Letter to the U.S. Navy From Red”)
Professional OPFOR
It is not only the U.S. Navy that is seeking a realistic OPFOR but also the U.S. Army. In their article “We Need More Professional OPFOR: Dedicated Professional Opposing Forces at Home Station Are an Asymmetric Advantage,” Major Thomas “Tom” Haycock writes for a Military Review Online Exclusive in April 2024 how the Army needs “an uncompromising ‘sparring partner’”:
A sparring partner should test you and advance you to a level of mastery that you cannot achieve on your own. Critically, a sparring partner offers an opportunity to experiment; your success against them in practice can lead to real advantages against real adversaries. Likewise, an uncompromising sparring partner should help you rapidly see which experiments do not work, and they should show you by exploiting your weakness the way a real adversary can. In contrast, a poor sparring partner reinforces bad habits, simulates an unthinking opponent, and gets as little value from the partnership as you do. (Haycock, “We Need More Professional OPFOR”)
Yet, the Blue Team Center has challenges, as Martinson themself points out:
The center cites three challenges specific to its research efforts. The first is a tendency to analyze Blue from China’s perspective—the mirror imaging the center seeks to avoid. The second tendency is to “use Red’s own command systems when playing Blue” despite the center possessing a team of experts dedicated to simulating different Blues’ command systems. The third is using Red’s operational methods when playing Blue. (Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War”)
Major Haycock presents a three-tier model of a professional OPFOR. Martinson’s article reveals the PLAN Blue Team Center strives to be a “Platinum – Best” OPFOR like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California is for the U.S. Army. If the PLAN Blue Team Center challenges are not resolved, however, they may perhaps be more properly categorized as “Silver – Good” or, if one wants to be charitable, maybe at the “Gold – Better” level.
Martinson ends their paper by asking, “What steps should be taken to further professionalize the community of [American] experts tasked with Red simulation?” The footnote, interestingly, goes to Rielage’s “Get Red Right” article. Flipov mentions that one step the U.S. Navy could take is to ensure they continue the Fleet Problem exercises started by then U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Swift in 2016:
In recent decades it appears the Navy did not have a true high-end threat exercise until Admiral Swift instituted the Fleet Problem exercises two years ago. It must be recognized that because the Fleet Problems are so new they still may not accurately represent real war. Instead, they simply set and combine the basic conditions to present a meaningful challenge to train for the high-end fight…The Fleet Problems are large-scale, long-duration, and open-ended events. Large-scale, in that the unit being tested can be a strike group or larger; long duration, in that the exercise is at least several days long instead of less than 24 hours; open-ended, in that they give wide latitude to the troops involved rather than narrowly constraining them to execute proscribed methods. Perhaps most critically, the Fleet Problems include an opposition force that is capable of inflicting painful losses. (Flipov, D. “How the Fleet Forgot to Fight, Pt. 1.”)
Lessons from a Religious Zealot
Naval historian Trent Hone in their book Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 also provides some insight into how wargaming plays a role in educating the fleet. First, however, Hone discusses Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of The influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 in 1890. Hone writes, “Mahan’s primary focus was not decisive battle. It was something far more radical. Mahan sought to redefine fundamentally what it meant to be a naval officer” (Hone, T. (2018). Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945. Naval Institute Press. p. 318). Home goes on to discuss the impact of Mahan in the early days of the U.S. Naval War College:
Mahan harnessed the college’s full potential and used it to support his reconceptualization of the naval officer. The first step was to create a new body of knowledge, a uniquely American view of naval strategy based on the idea that there were fundamental principles of naval warfare. Students at the college became familiar with these principles through rigorous study of historical conflict, war games (simulations), and sophisticated exercises. Officers practiced the new art of naval warfare and honed their skills in a variety of hypothetical situations. (Hone, p. 319)
Hone continues: “To put it another way, Navy officers became the high priests of Mahan’s new religion, his modern, American conceptualization of the art of naval warfare” (Hone, p. 321).
OPFOR Next
What sort of “zealously religious” OPFOR do we want for the U.S. Navy of today? Do we emulate “Blue by Red” or do we simply focus on “Getting Red right?” While Martinson has certainly shed some light on the PLAN approach, I again turn to Rielage, who also happened to be the the senior member of the Pacific Naval Aggressor Team, for advice from the “Open Letter”:
For us, the point of playing Red is not to beat Blue. It is to train Blue. At the end of the day, nothing would make us happier than to bring our best game to the fight and get our clock cleaned. At this point, getting there will require a number of uncomfortable conversations and a level of personal and institutional self-honesty that, bluntly, we have not cultivated. But we must, and soon. As the CNO has said, our “margins of victory are razor thin,” and the real adversaries keep improving. (Rielage, D.C.,“An Open Letter to the U.S. Navy From Red”)
What efforts the U.S. Navy has taken (or not) since 2018 are unclear. What is clear, however, is that the U.S. Navy needs to improve and wargaming—whether on the parquet floors of Newport or at sea—needs to keep up. Regretfully, Flipov points out this institutionally may not be the case:
The Navy has allowed the technical complexity of its ships and the flexibility of naval power to overwhelm the ability of Sailors to effectively train for war. Miscellaneous administrative burdens have also ballooned. Risk aversion has been mistaken for due diligence where a risk averse culture prone to adding training and inspections sought to mitigate risk that should have been accepted. Now it has become impossible to expect Sailors to become skilled at core warfighting tasks when there are too many boxes to check. (Flipov, D. “How the Fleet Forgot to Fight, Pt. 1.”)
Hone relates how the U.S. Navy, operating as a complex adaptive learning system in the lead up to World War II, has lessons applicable to today:
The Navy’s experience has several important implications. It suggests that innovations are rarely singular events. Instead, they are more likely to be triggered by an environment that is conducive to the sustained emergence of new, radical ideas. Innovation can therefore be most effectively fostered by creating such an environment, rather than trying to trigger a specific technique—innovation emerges from a broad learning system. (Hone, p. 346)
A professional, dedicated OPFOR is but one part of the innovation environment the U.S. Navy needs. I just hope we are not too late-to-need as the Davidson Window closes. Brent Sadler, former U.S. Navy submarine officer and now Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in the Allison Center for National Security writes:
In the final analysis, and chance aside, the outcome of a future major war will be determined before the fighting actually starts: the nation with the better-postured, better-resourced, and better-trained fleet is the nation that wins. Ensuring that the Navy remains ready, vigilant, and postured forward is the best way to deter war… (Sadler, B.D. (2023). U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century: A New Strategy for Facing the Chinese and Russian Threat. Naval Institute Press. pp. 275-276)
In the meantime, I will explore these same issues from a hobby wargaming perspective. Speaking of which, does anybody have the latest publication timeline for John Gorkowski’s Breaking the Chains 2.0 – War in the South China Sea listed by Compass Games as “July 2024?”
[Feature image: Founder of the PLAN Blue Team Center Vice Adm. Shen Jinlong tours USS Blue Ridge (Original U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Samuel Weldin)]
ed note: much of this discussion ties nicely into Dr Stephen Downes-Martin’s presentation from
Connections Online 2023, “How an Opponent Wargames is an Intelligence Collection Requirement”
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