************** There is some discussion about how the scouting cloud works, at least on simpler rules.
************** Me, Jul 16
Barth (since we're OOC talking game mechanics),
0.) Well there kind of were sheets, as I recalled. But I couldn't recall what information was 'visible' to us on them. Specifically I didn't recall if there was relative skill at infantry or cav command, and from Jim's reply there's a reason for that lacuna in my memory. {g}
Relatedly then, 5.) It kind of depends on how proactive we're planning to be. If we're only moving a couple of corps and not very far (due to sucky march speeds) then we don't need local scouting so much as we might need one or two wide detection nets or LoC blitzers. Good reminder, though, on the relative weakness of the French cav corps last game. And our Austrians might be effectively worse! -- Panzer I mob instead of Panzer II!
Also relatedly then, 1.1) Someone back early in the long list of messages, back before the game info was posted (just our emails), I forget who to credit sorry, pointed out that once the game starts it would be totally legitimate for the two reserve corps to hand off divisions to each other to create a solid grenadier and cav corps reserve. (We handed off divisions to each other on the French side with some regularity, too, the same way, though not with that goal.) So the question was whether Jim would allow us to do that before gamestart. From which I then extrapolated a couple of other re-org ideas.
{{Sabrenote: that was Lance and Jack, who started out commanding identical short but elite Reserve Corps of one Grenadier and one Cav division each. They had immediately hit on the idea of re-organizing their forces to be better suited to an offensive team role rather than reserve.}}
1.2 & 4.) Oh, that's right, Jim did confirm that! "I suspect His Charles-ness was referring to the reserve artillery division he had at his disposal at Jena-Auerstedt which did play a significant role at a critical battle or two, BUT IS NOT PRESENT IN THIS CAMPAIGN."
Giggity!
6.) I think Jim stated that while the rule as questioned was correct he didn't think there were any VL = double-lined roads on this map, regarding them as "very rare"? But I see double-lined roads all over the map, along with some single-lined roads for comparison. Aside from my prior example (parallel roads north and south of the Danbue between Ratburg and Passe {g}), there's also a single-lined road running straight map-north across the Danube out of Passau and into the hills/mountains, by comparison with a bunch of clearly double-lined roads connecting in Passau from other directions. (I've been eyeing that road into the mountains as a potential weak spot to exploit... but I can't quite trace a clear road line back west to Ratisbonne, so there would have to be some overland travel to get 'back to the road' going west once in the mountains. Cyrano may end up declaring that space off bounds anyway for convenience, since it's near/under the ruler.)
JRP (Charles)
************** Monday from me again
Now, having pondered things more (and caught up on other missives this morning):
(um, these numbers aren't meant to connect topically with my prior meanderings, they're just handy topic markers.)
1.) Ecnal's explanation of the 'scout cloud' rules we played under last time, and evidently will again, was very well put. CorComs will want to use their scouting clouds appropriately, typically with cav in the vanguard, although sometimes we would put our cav divisions echelon'd off left or right of our advance if we weren't moving a long way (since cav tires out a lot more easily and echeloning them to an angle of our advance tended to put them off-road).
This however also explains how a CavCorps commander might use his divisions as a detection net to give us an advance-alert across a wide area of the map that we aren't concentrating in. And if we cobbled two CavCorps together, one could be used for that purpose while the other blitzes for the LoC -- but then of course we're sacrificing scout probing on our advances. Or on our defenses if, say, a corps is holding behind a bridgeline: the cav division should be given orders to probe forward beyond the bridge and then fall back upon enemy approaches.
As Jim noted, though, keep in mind that in any case divisional non-player-characters still generate (via Jim/Cyrano himself) reports by courier which take game-time to arrive to the players. But Jim has proven good at keeping some basic NPC command protocols in mind if we send out divisions beyond immediate character range to do this-or-that.
2.) I'm not in position yet to check the player-character stats myself, but I note Ecnal/Kienmayer/Lancer's evaluation of Hohen/Barth as our best potential wing commander. In the previous game I assigned Wing Command based on other factors, not knowing to take this into account; those factors being prior player experience in games like this, and expected positioning of corps relative to each other and to me (in the center passing along notes. {g}) So for example West Wing's corps started out with Murat in command, because as the Cav Corps he was in position to scout the area better and faster, and so to make decisions for the initial assault through the passes; but then once the major town after the passes was captured (from Ruchel, ironically Barthheart! -- our prospective WC this time), West Wing command shifted on schedule over to the infantry player who had a little more experience in this game, so that Murat could proceed (if things seemed clear) out on a protracted clockwise loop behind the enemy seeking the LoC, and the two remaining mostly-infantry-corps (or three, I forget) could decide whether they needed to hang tough against Prussian counter-attack or (as things happened) prosecute forward toward Weimar.
I harmonized those plans (didn't quite 'make' them, credit goes to the marshals) without knowing about the extended-command factor, and West Wing might have suffered some debuffs consequentially. Or maybe not, I don't know. But I sure want to keep this factor in mind, now that I know about it!
3.) In regard to the excellent discussion of left-hook and right-hook, which I wanted to ponder some more before commenting: the left-hook plan would certainly mesh better with exploiting the game-scoring factors -- take Munich then exit map-west!
On this synthesis, the right-guard near Deggensdorf (where Isar runs into the Danube, iirc, don't have the map handy here), might then synch with the proposed plan of feinting up the shorter LoC path to Ratisbonne while we actually do something else toward Munich! Center Front in that case would perhaps be best spent with the proposed Cav Reserve Corps spread out to detect encroachment, perhaps probing across the center bridges first and then withdrawing back over them rather than being caught.
(At this point, some familiarity with a similar computer game system, CAMPAIGNS ON THE DANUBE, which also features a similar set of 1809 campaigns, leads me to ask Cyrano about any effects of large rivers on the scouting cloud. Can the Cav Corps commander shadow movement along the north side of the Isar from the south, by shuffling his divisions to follow the French? In the computer game, the Danube causes major problems with scouting as might be expected.)
In fact, we might WANT to sucker the French into trying a central crossing against relatively undefended positions, and then killbox them with the backs to the river. (Historical Charles succeeded at least once in something like this during the extended campaign.) If we've already taken Munich, then we're guarding that approach; and on a left-hook plan we're anchoring at the Isar/Danube conflux so that'll be hard for them to get past (especially if we're also forting at Deggendorf on the other side of the river). Logically they'd be looking for a less-defended crossing in the middle. Can we prepare in such a way to give them what they want and then ambush them? Don't know yet.
4.) Worth keeping in mind that on either a left-hook or right-hook plan (although left-hook looks better for scoring points), we are essentially sacrificing any short interior lines. Not necessarily a bad thing, but we _did_ start off reminding ourselves that it's necessarily a _good_ thing!
5.) Spreading out in a left-hook plan of some sort, would maximize our initial initiative positioning while minimizing our problems with sucky marching speed: our relatively fastest troops (CavCorps reserve) would be watching the center; right-wing wouldn't be really going anywhere anyway; left-wing only would have plans for a short scoring march; and whoever's _really_ guarding center would be minimizing maneuver for trapping a French crossing in a kill box. This might get a little boring for whoever's on right-wing duty...? But hard to say.
6.) On a spread-out plan like this, I'd pretty obviously have to be plopped in the center, I guess? -- so as to relatively minimize the average courier time back and forth. But the wings would be given lots of decentralization leeway, too.
7.) I feel like we ought to be at least trying to propose a gang-up advance plan, to keep our LoCs tight and for better mutual support, which might also better exploit initial French weaknesses. In that case, right-hook would clearly be better, but our left-center positions would be advancing, too, and much more closely. We'd be gambling hard that the French wouldn't just send one non-player division of cavalry with bot-orders to try looping around and camping on our supply line back to Passau. And we can't march fast at all, so the speedier French would have lots of time to mess with us -- and with our supply line -- from all sides. But they might panic, too.
If we did try a right hook (offtackle right?!), we'd have to make plans to advance and secure the north-bank road, too, especially so that we have any hope of getting _around_ Ratisbonne. This might also involve seeing how far Cyrano would let us game the map to send a force up, around, through the hills (near/under the ruler!)
I'm not feeling it yet, but I want to be fair about considering it.
8.) If we decided to super-stack on the left... well, clearly the only point would be to take Munich pronto and then blob our troops off the map and hope to trigger an auto-win within two or maybe three days. Otherwise we'd have to expect the French to be all over Passau, and then we're screwed. Unless taking Munich allows us to rejigger supply lines onto the map. Seems unlikely.
JRP