3102. BC Krishna, the incarnation of Vishnu [Trad]
The Athenian general and author Xenophon (427-355 BC), was so particular about the quality of his equipment that his shield came from Argos, his breastplate from Attica, his helmet from Boeotia, and his horse from Epidaurus.
185 BC. After many years of public service, having come out on the losing side in the convoluted familial politics of the Roman Republic, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (236–183 B.C.), victor over Hannibal, retired to a villa at Liternum, on the coast of Campania, about 20 miles north of Naples.
It was a pleasant spot, well watered and fruitful, and the great general could invest his energies in managing the estate.
Then, one day, several pirate ships were seen approaching off the coast. Assuming the pirates intended no good, Scipio promptly made preparations to deal with them. He put his household into a state of defense, fortifying the villa and arming his retainers, among whom were a number of old soldiers who had attached themselves to his service, as well as some of the local citizens and even his slaves.
What happened next was quite unexpected.
When the pirate captains landed on the nearby beach, they immediately sent their boats and men back to their ships. They then ostentatiously deposited their arms on the shore and approached Scipio’s villa in a dignified, even suppliant manner. At the front gate a spokesman for the pirates declared that they had come to pay their respects to the great commander, considering it an honor to met someone so favored by the gods.
Seeing them disarmed, and outnumbered, Scipio ordered the pirates admitted. The men paid homage to the household deities, greeted Scipio with great emotion, some even kissing his hand, and presented expensive gifts.
After a brief visit, during which they exchanged pleasantries with Scipio, the pirates returned to their ships, declaring how fortunate they had been to meet so great a man.
1478. George Plantagenet, 28, Duke of Clarence, conspirator against his brother Edward IV, executed in the Tower, traditionally by being drowned in a barrel of Malmsey
1653 Start of 3 day Battle of Portland. English fleet, under Robert Blake, was attacked by a Dutch fleet escorting a large convoy, under Lt.-Admiral Maarten Tromp. Figures are unclear but each fleet had 70-80 warships and whilst the British lost 1-3 warships the Dutch lost 8-12 and 40- 50 merchantmen.
1774, on the eve of the War for Independence, merchant ships registered in the Thirteen Colonies totaled about 450,000 tons.
Between 1814 and 1868, there were apparently 34 coups, pronunciamientos, or other military interventions in political life by the Spanish Army, most of which failed.
1898. Spain did badly in its war with the United States in 1898. She could have done better. Much better. In fact, it is difficult to disagree with the belief of many Spanish officers, including Vice-Admiral Pascual Cervera, who commanded the squadron sunk off Santiago, that their government had given little thought to strategic planning beyond the notion of losing the war quickly.
The shattering defeats inflicted upon the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and at Santiago were both avoidable.
Had the squadron in the Philippines been dispersed, rather than concentrated at Cavite, Commodore George Dewey would not have secured so signal a victory at the very outbreak of the war. With the Spanish ships dispersed among the archipelago's seven thousand islands scattered over 100,000 square miles of ocean, they would have posed a threat - a "fleet in being" - to the safety of an American expedition to seize Manila. Dewey would have found the task of searching all those potential hiding places tedious, time consuming, and potentially dangerous, yet necessary despite the relative worthlessness of the Spanish vessels in question. It would certainly have taken months to winkle out the last of the Spanish fleet. Of course, the Philippines were a side-show. The critical theater was the Atlantic.
In the Atlantic Admiral Cervera offered a much better strategy than merely sending his squadron to the Caribbean to be sunk. The U.S. could not safely invade Cuba until the Spanish fleet had been neutralized. Cervera proposed keeping the fleet concentrated in the Canary Islands. There it would continue to pose a threat to American maritime movements and at the same time be available to intercept possible American raids on the Spanish mainland. Spain's resources were adequate for this strategy. At the start of the war Spain had four major warships in commission, three Maria Teresa class armored cruisers plus the new armored cruiser Cristobal Colon, the ships that formed the core of the squadron that Cervera took to Santiago. Had Spain adopted this strategy, these vessels would have shortly been joined by two other major warships that were soon available, the battleship Pelayo, completing a refit, and the armored cruiser Carlos V, a very powerful vessel just entering service.
Even had they remained relatively inactive, these six heavy ships concentrated in the Canary Islands and supported by the available smaller cruisers and various lighter warships could easily have proven extremely worrisome to the United States Navy, constituting a relatively powerful fleet in being. From the Canaries, one or two of the armored cruisers and some of the half dozen or so smaller cruisers could have been sent to raid U.S. maritime commerce and threaten the East Coast, already experiencing something of a panic even before Cervera's squadron actually sailed. Such a strategy would have prolonged the war in several ways.
Had Spain adopted this course of action, the U.S. Navy would have been forced to divert resources from the Caribbean to chase the Spanish commerce raiders, and guard the Atlantic coastline. An American descent on Cuba or Puerto Rico would have been delayed, due to the shortage of escorts. Given that the U.S. Army was extremely concerned about the danger of operating in the Caribbean during the fever season, a landing in Puerto Rico or Cuba might easily have been delayed until the fall, assuming a decision was made to undertake one at all, given the potential danger from the Spanish fleet in the Canaries. Indeed, precisely what the U.S. would have done in such circumstance is difficult to determine. An expedition against the Canaries was actually considered by the U.S., but only after Cervera's defeat, and primarily as a means of preventing Spain from attempting to reinforce the Philippines. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Navy could have done much more than undertaken a massive raid, lacking the logistical train to support a more serious expedition at such distance from North America
Spain did badly in its war with the United States in 1898. She could have done better. Much better. In fact, it is difficult to disagree with the belief of many Spanish officers, including Vice-Admiral Pascual Cervera, who commanded the squadron sunk off Santiago, that their government had given little thought to strategic planning beyond the notion of losing the war quickly.
The shattering defeats inflicted upon the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and at Santiago were both avoidable.
Had the squadron in the Philippines been dispersed, rather than concentrated at Cavite, Commodore George Dewey would not have secured so signal a victory at the very outbreak of the war. With the Spanish ships dispersed among the archipelago's seven thousand islands scattered over 100,000 square miles of ocean, they would have posed a threat - a "fleet in being" - to the safety of an American expedition to seize Manila. Dewey would have found the task of searching all those potential hiding places tedious, time consuming, and potentially dangerous, yet necessary despite the relative worthlessness of the Spanish vessels in question. It would certainly have taken months to winkle out the last of the Spanish fleet. Of course, the Philippines were a side-show. The critical theater was the Atlantic.
In the Atlantic Admiral Cervera offered a much better strategy than merely sending his squadron to the Caribbean to be sunk. The U.S. could not safely invade Cuba until the Spanish fleet had been neutralized. Cervera proposed keeping the fleet concentrated in the Canary Islands. There it would continue to pose a threat to American maritime movements and at the same time be available to intercept possible American raids on the Spanish mainland. Spain's resources were adequate for this strategy. At the start of the war Spain had four major warships in commission, three Maria Teresa class armored cruisers plus the new armored cruiser Cristobal Colon, the ships that formed the core of the squadron that Cervera took to Santiago. Had Spain adopted this strategy, these vessels would have shortly been joined by two other major warships that were soon available, the battleship Pelayo, completing a refit, and the armored cruiser Carlos V, a very powerful vessel just entering service.
Even had they remained relatively inactive, these six heavy ships concentrated in the Canary Islands and supported by the available smaller cruisers and various lighter warships could easily have proven extremely worrisome to the United States Navy, constituting a relatively powerful fleet in being. From the Canaries, one or two of the armored cruisers and some of the half dozen or so smaller cruisers could have been sent to raid U.S. maritime commerce and threaten the East Coast, already experiencing something of a panic even before Cervera's squadron actually sailed. Such a strategy would have prolonged the war in several ways.
Had Spain adopted this course of action, the U.S. Navy would have been forced to divert resources from the Caribbean to chase the Spanish commerce raiders, and guard the Atlantic coastline. An American descent on Cuba or Puerto Rico would have been delayed, due to the shortage of escorts. Given that the U.S. Army was extremely concerned about the danger of operating in the Caribbean during the fever season, a landing in Puerto Rico or Cuba might easily have been delayed until the fall, assuming a decision was made to undertake one at all, given the potential danger from the Spanish fleet in the Canaries. Indeed, precisely what the U.S. would have done in such circumstance is difficult to determine. An expedition against the Canaries was actually considered by the U.S., but only after Cervera's defeat, and primarily as a means of preventing Spain from attempting to reinforce the Philippines. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Navy could have done much more than undertaken a massive raid, lacking the logistical train to support a more serious expedition at such distance from North America
1942. USS Truxtun (DD 229) and USS Pollux (AKS-2) sink during a heavy storm in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, with the loss of 204 lives. At that time, the greatest loss of US sailors in the war.
1943 Gestapo arrest "White Rose" resistance cell in Munich